The Unwinnable War? How "Flickers of Freedom" Tries to Save Free Will
For centuries, the debate over free will has been a philosophical cage match with no clear winner. In one corner, we have Hard Determinism, the view that every event, including every human thought and action, is the inescapable result of prior causes. In this "block universe," your "choice" to read this article was baked in since the Big Bang.
In the other corner, we have traditional Libertarian Free Will, which insists that we are the genuine authors of our actions, capable of choosing otherwise in a given moment. The problem? It struggles to explain how. If your choice isn't caused by your reasons, character, or desires (i.e., by you), it seems... random. And a random, uncaused spasm is no more "free" than a determined one.
This is the classic dilemma: either our choices are caused (and thus not free) or they are random (and thus not willed). We seem trapped, forced to choose between a universe of meaningless puppets or a universe of arbitrary dice-rolls.
But what if this is a false choice? What if freedom isn't an all-or-nothing supernatural power, but a biological, computational process? This is where a fascinating and pragmatic concept comes in: the "Flickers of Freedom."
The Ancient Stalemate: A Locked Universe or a Game of Dice?
To appreciate the "Flickers" model, we have to understand the sheer depth of the problem it tries to solve.
The determinist's case is strong. We live in a physical world governed by cause and effect. A billiard ball hits another, and the outcome is predictable. Our brains are physical objects, too—fantastically complex "meat computers" running on electrochemical signals. Why should they be exempt? As the philosopher Sam Harris, a prominent determinist, argues, you are not the author of your thoughts. They simply appear in your consciousness. You can't decide what you'll think next any more than you can decide to stop your heart.
The traditional libertarian, in response, has often had to appeal to something... spooky. They might posit a "soul" or a special kind of "agent-causation" that exists outside the normal physical chain of events. To critics, this looks like wishful thinking, a "ghost in the machine" that violates the known laws of physics just to make us feel special.
So, the challenge is this: Can we find a way to break the iron chain of determinism without making our actions random and meaningless? We need a model that gives us both genuine new possibilities genuine control.
What Are the "Flickers of Freedom"? Bob Doyle's Two-Stage Model
The term "Flickers of Freedom" is most closely associated with the work of philosopher and information scientist Robert O. Doyle. He proposes a "two-stage" model of free will that attempts to use the messiness of the physical world to our advantage.
He argues that the classic dilemma (caused vs. random) is a bug in our logic, not in reality. His model elegantly separates the "free" part from the "will" part.
Stage 1: The "Free" Part (Generating Possibilities)
This is where the "flickers" come in. Doyle points out that the universe, at its most fundamental level, is not a perfectly determined, clockwork machine. On the contrary, quantum mechanics tells us the micro-world is bubbling with indeterminacy. Events happen probabilistically, not certainly.
Doyle's key insight is that this quantum noise isn't just "errors" to be ignored. He argues that the brain, as a biological system, harnesses this indeterminacy. This quantum-level randomness (and other forms of noise in a warm, wet, biological brain) provides "flickers" of novelty.
Crucially, these flickers are not the decision itself. They are the raw material for decisions.
Think of it this way: When you're trying to decide what to do tonight, your brain doesn't just pull up a single, predetermined option. It generates a menu of alternative possibilities. "I could watch a movie." "I could call a friend." "I could read a book." "I could suddenly learn to juggle."
Doyle's model says this brainstorming phase is "free" because the generation of these options is not strictly determined. New, creative, and sometimes bizarre ideas flicker into existence, breaking the chain of "one cause leads to one effect."
Stage 2: The "Will" Part (The Deliberate Selection)
If the process stopped at Stage 1, it would be random. A brain that just acts on the last random flicker is not free; it's chaotic.
This is where Stage 2: The Selection comes in. Once the menu of possibilities is generated, the will gets to work. This second stage, in Doyle's view, is "adequately determined."
This means your choice from the menu is made by you—your character, your values, your memories, your goals, your reasoning. You evaluate the "flickers" and select the one that aligns best with your desires and plans.
You discard "learn to juggle" (not realistic).
You consider "call a friend" (good, but you're tired).
You select "watch a movie" (this fits your character and current state).
The selection itself is a determined process—determined by your mind. But the options you were selecting from were not predetermined.
This two-stage model solves the classic dilemma.
Is it random? No. The selection is deliberate and controlled by your character.
Is it determined? No. The generation of options is indeterministic, meaning genuine, new possibilities exist.
Freedom, in this view, is a two-step process: First, you (indeterministically) create. Then, you (deterministically) choose.
Why This Model is Appealing: Proponents and Similar Ideas
The "Flickers" model is a powerful brand of Compatibilism—the idea that free will and determinism (or at least, adequate determinism) can coexist.
Its main proponent, Doyle, argues that this model is the only one that is truly consistent with modern physics. It doesn't ask for a supernatural soul, and it doesn't ignore the randomness inherent in the universe. It uses that randomness as a feature, not a bug. It's a plausible, physical mechanism for free will.
This model also finds an ally in thinkers like Daniel Dennett. While Dennett might be skeptical of a reliance on quantum mechanics, his own model of free will is strikingly similar. Dennett sees free will as a complex computational ability, evolved over time, to "generate" and "deliberate on" future possibilities. He agrees that our freedom lies in our sophisticated ability to evaluate options that are generated by a complex (and perhaps noisy) brain.
The appeal is simple: It grounds free will in biology and physics. It makes free will a skill we can cultivate—by improving our brainstorming (Stage 1) and our rational deliberation (Stage 2).
The Critiques: Is It Just Noise and Determinism?
The "Flickers of Freedom" model is not without its powerful detractors, who attack it from all sides.
Critique 1: The Hard Determinist
The hard determinist (like Sam Harris or Derk Pereboom) would look at Stage 2 and say, "Aha! The fix is in."
So what if the "menu" of options is a little random? The selection process—the "will" part—is still, by Doyle's own admission, "adequately determined." Your character, values, and reasons are themselves the product of your genes and your environment, none of which you chose.
They would argue that the way you choose from the menu is just as determined as everything else. The "flickers" are just irrelevant noise that doesn't change the final, inevitable outcome of your neural machinery. You're still just a complex puppet, even if your strings jiggle a bit.
Critique 2: The Neuroscientific Objection
Many physicists and neuroscientists are deeply skeptical of any theory that relies on "quantum effects" in the brain.
They argue that the brain is a large, warm, wet system. Any delicate quantum "flickers" would be "washed out" by the massive thermal and chemical noise of the brain. It's like trying to hear a single pin drop in the middle of a rock concert. These critics argue that brain processes are, for all practical purposes, classical and deterministic. In their view, "quantum consciousness" or "quantum free will" is a solution in search of a problem.
Critique 3: The Traditional Libertarian
A traditional libertarian (like Robert Kane) might argue that this model doesn't go far enough.
For Kane, true freedom requires that the moment of choice itself is indeterministic, especially in "Self-Forming Actions" (SFAs)—those difficult moral choices where your will is torn.
Doyle's model, by separating the "random" generation from the "determined" selection, doesn't satisfy them. They would say that if the selection (Stage 2) is determined by your character, then you are still a "slave" to your character. They want the freedom to override their character in the moment, a power this model doesn't explicitly grant.
A Flicker of Hope?
The "Flickers of Freedom" concept doesn't end the free will debate. No single concept ever will. But it accomplishes something brilliant: it reframes the entire argument.
It forces us to stop thinking of "free will" as a magical yes/no button. Instead, it presents it as a process. It suggests that freedom is not an absolute, but a matter of degrees.
Perhaps you don't have the "ultimate" freedom to rewind the universe and choose differently. But according to this model, you do have the freedom that matters: the ability to generate new ideas and the power to select the one that most truly represents you.
It's a model that is both creative and controlled. It breaks the grip of the past by injecting new possibilities, and it grants us authorship by having our determined character make the final cut. It may not be the "ghost in the machine" that some philosophers wanted, but it might just be the "freedom in the machine" that we actually have.
